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Bailey v. Dolphin International, Inc.
697 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir. 1983)
On September 16, 1977, the Bali Dolphin, a non-self-propelled
jack-up drilling rig, capsized and sank while being towed a short
distance to a new drilling site in Indonesian territorial waters. Jo-
seph Buenaflor, a citizen and permanent resident of the Philip-
pines, who had been hired in Singapore, was on board at the time
of the accident and perished when the rig sank. On September 14,
1978, a special administrator of Buenaflor's estate brought a
wrongful death action in the federal district court for the Northern
District of California. The action was brought under the Jones Act,
46 U.S.C. § 688, and, alternatively, under the Death on the High
Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 761, against Dolphin, Inc., Union-Indonesia,
Pertamina, the three tugboats involved in the accident, and an in-
surance company.
The court determined that it lacked personal jurisdiction over
Dolphin, Inc., and transferred the entire case to the Southern Dis-
trict of Texas pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). The Texas court
concluded that American law did not apply to the claim presented
and decided that, under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the
claim could be adjudicated more conveniently in another forum.
The central issue presented to the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals was; whether American law applies, and, if not, whether the
district court abused its discretion in dismissing the case. The
court relied on Chiazor v. Transworld Drilling Company, 648 F.2d
1015, which held that the domicile of the injured party, the loca-
tion where the wrongful act occurred, and the place where contrac-
tual relations were entered are the crucial factors to be considered
when determining which law to apply in stationary drilling vessel
situations. The court found the contacts with Indonesia, Singapore,
and the Philippines to be more substantial than those with the
United States and, therefore, held that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in conditionally dismissing the case. In addi-
tion, the court held that the district court was not required to
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specify which forum appellants should file suit in. Although the
court found no abuse of discretion, the case was reversed and re-
manded to the district court to obtain a more carefully drafted or-
der of dismissal.
II. ALIENS
Artukovic v. Immigration and Naturalization Service
693 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1982)
In 1948, Andria Artukovic came to the United States and,
under a false name, was issued a visitor's visa which he subse-
quently overstayed. The Board of Immigration Appeals ordered
him deported in 1953, but this order was not executed because the
government of Yugoslavia had commenced proceedings to extra-
dite him for trial on murder charges. The U.S. denied extradition
and, in 1958, granted a stay of deportation pursuant to § 253(h) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 which forbids depor-
tation of aliens who would be subject to persecution upon return to
their home country.
In 1978, the Immigration and Naturalization Act was amended
to provide that any alien who had been a member of the Nazi gov-
ernment of Germany or who had been affiliated therewith, and
who had persecuted people because of their race, religion, national
origin or political opinion was deportable and was not eligible for a
stay of deportation under § 253(h). As a result, the Immigration
Board of Appeals, without a hearing, revoked Artukovic's stay of
deportation.
Artukovic appealed directly to the United States Court of Ap-
peals and argued that the 1978 amendment was not applicable
since the deportation proceedings against him began in 1952, prior
to the enactment of the amendment. The court held that Congress
intended the amendment to apply retroactively and it was there-
fore applicable to Artukovic's case. However, the court still vacated
the revocation of the stay, holding that the process requires that
there be a new hearing in which the government must prove by
"clear and convincing evidence" that Artukovic was a member of




695 F.2d 1141 (11th Cir. 1983)
On July 8, 1981, defendant Moreno-Pulido sold a counterfeit
'green card' to a government informant. On two subsequent occa-
sions, he had sold sheets of blank 'green card' forms to the same
informant. Moreno-Pulido was later convicted on four counts; sell-
ing a counterfeit 'green card' in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1426(b);
manufacturing the card in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1426(a); and
selling the blank sheets also in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1426(b).
The first issue which the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit addressed, was whether Moreno-Pulido's contenton;
that uncut, blank 'green card' forms do not come within the pur-
view of § 1426(b) (which prohibits the sale of counterfeit papers
relating to the registry of aliens) was viable. Moreno-Pulido con-
tended that the forms, for which he was convicted of duplicating
and selling, were not proscribed by the statute because further
steps were necessary before they could serve their ultimate pur-
pose. The court, however, relied on the quality of the forms, rather
than on their incompleteness, in holding that its duplication and
sale was violative of the statute. The test which the court applied
was; whether the form bore such a similarity to the genuine 'green
card' as was "calculated to deceive an honest, sensible, and unsus-
pecting person of ordinary observation and care when dealing with
a person supposed to be upright and honest."
The second issue facing the court was whether there was suffi-
cient evidence to convict the defendant on the manufacturing
count. The court, after viewing the entire record, concluded that
there was.
III. ANTITRUST
El Cid Ltd. v. New Jersey Zinc Co.
551 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
El Cid Ltd. brought suit against the New Jersey Zinc Co., and
others, for an alleged violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act (Act).
The plaintiff claimed that the defendants had used "unfair means"
to prevent them from obtaining the necessary funds from their
American backers to purchase eight gold mining concessions in Bo-
livia. The plaintiffs alleged that a large portion of both the revenue
and the gold from the mines would have entered the United States
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stream of commerce if they had been allowed to purchase and
mine the concessions. Moreover, they contended that they would
have purchased several million dollars worth of mining equipment
in the United States .to mine the concession.
The District Court for the Southern District of New York
granted the defendants motion for summary judgment after apply-
ing the Alcoa' rule which allows for the operation of the Sherman
Act as long as the effect on United States commerce is not de min-
imus. The court found that even if the defendants had used "un-
fair means" to prevent the plaintiff from obtaining the necessary
funds, the effect of such an activity did not have a sufficient im-
pact on the commerce of the United States to warrant application
of the Sherman Act because the plaintiff had never sold any gold
in the United States, nor did it have plans to do so. Moreover, the
Act was designed by Congress to protect competition, not
competitors.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Trane Co. v. Baldrige
552 F. Supp 1378 (W.D. Wisc. 1983)
Plaintiffs, several American companies who engage in business
with members of the League of Arab States, brought this action
challenging the part of the Export Administration Act ("Act")
which prohibits American businesses from providing information
to a boycotting country about that company's past or present busi-
ness relationship with a boycotted country. The plaintiffs argued
that the challenged prohibitions infringed upon their first amend-
ment right of free speech, their fifth amendment substantive and
procedural due process rights, and their fundamental rights of pri-
vacy under the ninth amendment. The action arose as a result of
Kuwait, a member of the League of Arab States, requesting infor-
mation from the plaintiffs concerning their dealings with Israel.
Israel, at that time, was being boycotted by the League. The plain-
tiffs' failure to furnish this information was considered to be suffi-
cient grounds for the participating Arab states to blacklist the
companies. On the other hand, furnishing the requested informa-
tion would expose the plaintiffs to criminal sanctions for violating





The United States District Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin, on a cross-motion for summary judgment, initially
found that the information which was requested by Kuwait was
intended to further business interests, and therefore, the Act's pro-
scription must be measured under the first amendment standards
for commercial speech. The Supreme Court developed a four part
test to determine whether such speech is protected under the first
amendment.
The threshold question under the test is whether the prohib-
ited speech is lawful. If so, then the prohibition must fail unless all
of the other prongs of the test are met. Those prongs include: (1)
whether there is a substantial government interest, (2) whether
that interest is directly advanced by the regulation, and (3)
whether the regulation is narrowly drawn.
As to the threshold question, the court found that businesses
giving information about their past business dealings with a boy-
cotted country was lawful speech. The court then found that the
government did indeed have a substantial interest in not allowing
American business to further the Arab boycott of Israel. This in-
terest was directly advanced by the Act, which the court found to
be sufficiently narrowly drawn. Thus, the prohibition was valid.
Using a similar analysis, the court found that the plaintiffs'
substantive due process rights were not violated because the gov-
ernmental interests furthered by the Act were much greater than
the plaintiff's interests, upon which the Act allegedly infringed.
Moreover, the plaintiffs' procedural due process rights were held
not to be violated because the government would not be recogniz-
ing or enforcing unlawful conduct with this regulation.
Finally, the court held that the fundamental personal rights
protected by the ninth amendment (i.e., the penumbras of the spe-
cific guarantees of the Bill of Rights) does not protect the plain-
tiffs' desired communication.
V. EXPROPRIATION
Cruz v. Zapata Ocean Resources, Inc.
695 F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1982)
In 1975, the Republic of Ecuador seized four American fishing
vessels which were located approximately 100 miles off the Ecua-
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dorian coast. Ecuador claimed a 200 mile fishing limit which the
United States did not recognize. The owners and crews of the ships
incurred substantial losses resulting from the seizure. Subse-
quently, fifteen non-resident aliens brought suit against Zapata
Ocean Resources, Inc., the parent corporation which owned the
vessels, to recover their looses. Zapata and the vessel owners then
filed third party claims against the United States government for
reimbursements based on several guarantee agreements entered
into with the Secretary of State pursuant to section 3 of 22 U.S.C.
§ 1973 (Fisherman's Protective Act). The United States District
Court for the Southern District of California granted summary
judgment for the United States on the reimbursement claims.
The issue presented to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, was; whether the Secretary of Commerce exceeded
his authority in issuing regulation 50 C.F.R. § 258.8(g) which
barred consideration of claims made by non-resident alien crew
members pursuant to section 7 of 22 U.S.C. § 1977 (Fisherman's
Protective Act) for losses resulting from the seizure of a fishing
vessel by a foreign nation. The court found that the intent behind
the Act was to encourage the operators of American fishing vessels
to continue to fish in disputed waters. Thus, the Secretary of Com-
merce had exceeded his authority in issuing a regulation which was
inconsistent with the act's purpose.
The court also held that, while customary international law
prevents a state from presenting a claim on behalf of a national of
another state, alien seamen serving on the vessels of a nation con-
stitute an exception to this general rule.
VI. EXTRADITION
Kear v. Hilton
51 U.S.L.W. 2469 (4th Cir. 1983)
Kear, a professional bondsman, sought a writ of habeas corpus
to avoid being extradited to Canada to face kidnapping charges.
The charges resulted from Kear's seizure of someone who had
jumped bail and escaped to Toronto, Canada and forcing him to
return to Florida.
Kear contended that he could not be extradited pursuant to
the United States-Canada Extradition Treaty because it only ap-
plies to crimes punishable by the laws of both countries, and be-
cause it would not be a crime under American law for a Canadian
[Vol. 15:1
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bondsman to seize a bail jumper in this country and return him to
Canada. The court conceded that it would not be a crime for an
American bondsman to capture and return a bail jumper to a court
within the United States, but it did not agree that there is no crim-
inal liability for a foreign bounty hunter to cross the U.S. border to
make a preemptory capture and return. The court then held that
the American and Canadian kidnapping statutes were sufficiently
similar to cause the treaty to operate.
Kear also contended that he did not violate Canadian law be-
cause Canada permits preemptory capture and return of bail
jumpers. The court, however, held that it was not in a position to
question the Canadian authorities' belief that a law had been bro-
ken, as manifested by the kidnapping charges and extradition pro-
ceedings. Moreover, Canada does not permit bonding for compen-
sation. Thus, Kear's activities violated Canadian public policy.
Finally, the court held that Kear's contention that the bail
jumper had consented to a preemptory seizure when he was admit-
ted on bail is a defense that should have been raised during the
criminal proceedings against him, not in the extradition proceed-
ings. Thus, the court denied the writ of habeas corpus.
VII. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
United States v. Gollwitzer,
697 F.2d 1357 (7th Cir. 1983)
Two individuals who had been convicted of conspiracy to im-
port, and of possession with intent to distribute, marijuana, moved
to suppress the evidence (i.e., bales of marijuana) which had been
used to convict them, on the ground that it had been obtained by
an unreasonable search and seizure violative of the fourth amend-
ment. The defendants were on board the "Lanaya", a 42-foot ship
capable of ocean travel, near Port Everglades, Florida when they
were spotted by customs agents. The agents noticed that the boat
was riding low in the water, that all the cabin windows were cur-
tained and that the cabin door was closed. The agents then ap-
proached and pulled alongside of the Lanaya and identified them-
selves. In response to questions posed by the agents, the
defendants stated that they did not know who owned the boat and
that the ship's papers were in the unlocked cabin. Following the
dialogue, the agents boarded the Lanaya and immediately detected
the odor of marijuana. One of the agents approached the cabin
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door and observed numerous bales of marijuana through an uncov-
ered portion of the window. The district court denied the defen-
dants' motion to suppress the evidence.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit affirmed, holding that the government's interest in regulat-
ing foreign commerce and preventing drug smuggling outweighs
the reasonable expectation of privacy of sailors on large ocean trav-
eling boats which were found in an area where illicit cargo is com-
monly carried. The court concluded that, in determining the rea-
sonableness of a stop and inquiry without reasonable suspicion, the
degree of privacy reasonably expected varies with the type of craft
involved, (i.e., there is a greater expectation of privacy on a house-
boat than on a fishing boat), the particular area of the vessel in-
volved and the location of the ship.
VIII. TAXATION
Xerox Corp. v. Harris County, Texas
103 S. Ct. 523 (1982)
Xerox corporation manufactured parts for copying machines
in the United States which were shipped to Mexico City, Mexico
for assembly by an affiliate there. After being assembled, the ma-
chines were sent to Houston, Texas to await shipment to Latin
America. While in Houston, they were stored in a bonded ware-
house which was under the control of the Uniied States customs
service.
In 1977, the City of Houston assessed an ad valorem personal
property tax on the copiers. Harris County then followed suit, as-
sessing a similar tax. Xerox contested the assessments as being an
unconstitutional violation of both the Commerce and Import-Ex-
port Clauses. The trial court agreed, but, was reversed on appeal.
The Texas Supreme Court then denied Xerox's application for a
writ of error. The United States Supreme Court found that it had
jurisdiction over the case and then declared the tax uncon-
stitutional.
When Congress created the customs system pursuant to its
powers under the Commerce Clause, it provided for government-
supervised bonded warehouses in which imports might be stored
and re-exported without payment of duty. Waiving these duties
benefitted American industry by encouraging shippers to use
American ports as transhipment centers. In the instant case, the
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taxes in question were large enough to offset the benefits which
would have been gained by waiving the duties. Therefore, in light
of the pervasiveness of the systems of customs regulation, the Su-
preme Court held that state property taxes on goods stored in
bonded warehouses are preempted by the Congressional regulation
of customs duties.
IX. TREATIES
Powell v. United States Bureau of Prisoners
695 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1983)
In 1976, Thomas Powell was convicted of a drug offense by a
Mexican court and was sentenced to a term of six years and three
months. While serving time in a Mexican jail, he earned 366 days
of work credit. In 1978, he was transferred to the United States
pursuant to the United States-Mexico treaty governing the trans-
fer of prisoners, and was allowed to complete his sentence in this
country. Five months later, Powell was paroled by the United
States Parole Commission. While on parole, Powell was convicted
of another drug offense and was sentenced to a term of two years.
As a result of this conviction, the Parole Commission revoked his
parole, ordered that he fully serve his original sentence, and re-
voked the work credit that he had earned.
Powell filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming
that the order which provided for the forfeiture of his work credit
was a violation of the U.S.-Mexico treaty governing the transfer of
prisoners. The District Court granted the writ and ordered the
work credit restored.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reversed; holding that the Treaty does not provide for the
treatment of work credits and, therefore, the laws of the receiving
state (the United States in this case) control. Under the laws of the
United States, work credits are to be treated as "good time" which
may be forfeited upon violation of any conditions of the prisoner's
release.
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